The 1-convex TU games have appealing theoretical and practical applications. We identify the family of 1-convex n-person games with the same cores but different vNM solutions. A characterization of the set of imputations which are not dominated by the core and an explicit description of particular vNM solutions are given. These solutions consist of the core and complementary set which allows a simple interpretation.
Introduction and definitions
The core [3] and vNM stable sets [4] are the fundamental solution concepts in cooperative game theory. But both are open to criticism. First of all, they may not exist. The core can consists of 'tyrannical' allocation that gives all of society's resources to a single agent. There are no universal algorithm for computing the vNM solutions and a nonemptiness criterion. The complexity of vNM solutions is such that results only were obtained for special cases. As far as we know, vNM solutions of 1-convex games [1] - [2] not yet seen in the literature. In this paper we concentrate on the family of (0,1)-normalized 1-convex games. Our aim is to construct vNM solutions for some games of this family and provide their interpretation.
Let's recall the facts that will be used later. A transferable utility game with player set N = {1, . . . , n} is defined by a function ν : 2 N → R satisfying ν( ) = 0. The set of such games is denoted by G N . For coalition K ∈ 2 N \ {∅} denote its cardinality by |K|. For x ∈ R N and K ∈ 2 N \ {∅} let x(K) = i∈K x i . We will use x(i, ..., k), K ∪ i to denote x({i, 
The imputation set, dual imputation set and core of a game ν are I(ν) = {x ∈ X(ν) :
there is a coalition K such that x K y. For any A ⊆ I(ν) denote by Dom K A the set consisting of all imputations that are dominated via K by some element in A and let Ω = {K ∈ 2 N : 2 ≤ |K| ≤ n − 1}.
Let N M(ν) be a collection of vNM solutions of ν ∈ G N . A nonempty core consists of undominated imputations, i.e. it is internally stable. An externally stable core is called stable. It coincides with the (unique) stable set.
Results
A game ν ∈ G N with i∈N ν(i) = ν(N ) is out of interest. Any N -essential game is strategically equivalent to the unique game in (0,1)-form and the core as well as vNM solutions are relative invariant w.r.t. strategic equivalence. It is then natural to focus attention on the polytope P N ⊂ G N of nonnegative (0,1)-normalized games. Denote by CP N and 1CP N the subsets of convex and 1-convex games in P N . First we identify the family of nonsymmetric 1-convex games generated by symmetric convex one and show that their cores (except for convex game) are not stable.
Then:
Proof. (i) The first statement was proved in [5] . The second one follows by the convexity of ω.
(ii) Obviously ω, ν H ∈ P N . Therefore, I(ν H ) = I(ω) and these sets are of above form. Since
The core of any 1-convex game coincides with the dual imputation set [2] . The equalities m
In order to describe the vNM solution for game ν H we need to characterize the subset of imputations of game ω which are dominated by C(ω) via fixed coalition K ∈ Ω (Lemma 2.2) and the subset of imputations of game ν H which are undominated by C(ν H ) (Lemma 2.3).
Lemma 2.2. Let K ∈ Ω. Then x ∈ Dom K C(ω) iff x ∈ I(ω) and the following condition holds
(1)
, where
Since i∈K b i > ∆, the above system is compatible. Obviously y ∈ I(ω). Using Theorem 2.1(ii) and y i ≤ṁ, i ∈ N , we obtain y ∈ C(ω). Moreover,
. Then x ∈ I(ω) and there exists y ∈ C(ω) such that y K x, i.e. x i < y i ≤ṁ, i ∈ K, and x(K) < y(K) = ω(K). Hence, x satisfies (1). (1) and
Take x ∈ L. Then x ∈ I(ν H ) = I(ω) and there exists K ∈ Ω 1 H such that x ∈ Dom K C(ω). By lemma 2.2, x satisfies (1). Since x / ∈ C(ν H ) then, by (1) and Theorem 2.1(ii), there must exists at least one l ∈ N \ K such that x l >ṁ. So x satisfies (3). If there is r ∈ (N \ H) \ l such that x r <ṁ, then using (1) we see that x(K ∪ r) < |K|ṁ. By Lemma 2.2, x ∈ Dom K∪r C(ω). This contradicts (4) (1)- (3) hold. By Theorem 2.1(ii) and
The next theorem provides the description of explicit form of particular vNM solution for game ν H with H containing two players.
where the set F H consists of all x ∈ I(ν H ) satisfying
Proof. As will become clear below
and x ∈ R N + it follows that x i <ṁ, i ∈ H. Using (5) and (6) we obtain
=ṁ. So x satisfies (2) and conditions (1), (3) with
To prove internal stability of Q H , note that, by Lemma 2.3,
Suppose, to the contrary, that x S y for some S ∈ Ω. We can write S = S ∪ S , where S ⊆ N \ H, S ⊆ H. Then:
To prove external stability of Q H it suffices (in view of Lemma 2.3) to show that L \ F H ⊂ DomF H . Let x min = min i∈N \H x i and H = {1, 2}. Take
Then x belongs to I(ν H ) and satisfies (1) with K = H, i.e. x satisfies (5). But x does not satisfy (6) since otherwise x ∈ F H holds, which gives a contradiction. Consequently, ∆ = x(N \ H) − (n − 2)x min > 0. Define y ∈ R N , where
Such α 1 , α 2 obviously exist, y ∈ I(ν H ) and (6) holds. The vector y satisfies (5) because y(H) = x(H)+α 1 +α 2 <ṁ. Thus y ∈ F H . Let i min ∈ arg min i∈N \H
We see that y H∪i min x because y(H∪i min ) =
Our first example demonstrates that Theorem 2.4 cannot be extended to game ν H with |H| > 2. and y i > x i , i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Thus, F H violates the internal stability property.
The last theorem describes vNM solution for five-person game ν H with |H| = 3.
where the set P H consists of all x ∈ I(ν H ) satisfying (5)- (6) and
Proof. Some statements that will be used in the following proof are similar to those in proof of Theorem 2.4. They are given without the explanations. Take x ∈ P H = ∅. Let H = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose x i ≥ṁ for some i ∈ H. For example, x 1 ≥ṁ. By (5) and (6),
. This implies that x 2 + x 3 ≥ x 1 ≥ṁ and x(H) ≥ 2ṁ = (|H| − 1)ṁ, which contradicts (5) . Thus
To prove internal stability of W H we need only to show that P H ∩DomP H = ∅. Take x, y ∈ P H , x = y. Suppose, to the contrary, that x S y for some S ∈ Ω. Then S = S ∪ S , where ∅ = S ⊆ N \ H, ∅ = S ⊆ H. If |S | = 1 ore S = H, then y is not dominated by x. If |S | = 2, then using (8) and µ y >ṁ we obtain x(S) > y(S) = |S |µ y + y(S ) ≥ |S |µ
, which gives a contradiction. To prove external stability of W H it suffices to show that L\P H ⊂ DomP H . Take now x ∈ L \ P H ⊂ I(ν H ). We distinguish the following cases.
Case 1: x ∈ L H , i.e. x(H) < 2ṁ, x min = min i∈N \H x i ≥ṁ, max i∈N \H x i >ṁ and x i <ṁ, i ∈ H. In this case, x satisfies (5). Subcase 1: there exists S ⊂ H with |S| = 2 such that x min + x(S) < 2ṁ. Let S = {2, 3}. Consider y ∈ R N , where
Under the above assumptions, such α 2 , α 3 exist, 0 < α 1 = 2ṁ − x min − β ≤ m − β <ṁ and y(H) = 2α 1 < 2ṁ. We see that y ∈ I(ν H ) and (5)- (6) hold. Further, µ y + y(S) = x min + β + α 1 = 2ṁ and µ y + y(1, 2) = x min + β + α 1 + x 2 + α 2 > 2ṁ. Similarly µ y + y(1, 3) > 2ṁ. Hence y satisfies (8). We obtain y ∈ P H . Moreover, y {2,3,4} x.
Subcase 2: x min + x(S) ≥ 2ṁ for all S ⊂ H with |S| = 2. Then x 4 = x 5 since otherwise x ∈ P H . Define y by formula (7), where
The last system is solvable because (5)- (6) hold. Since µ y + y(S) > x min + x(S) ≥ 2ṁ for all S ⊂ H with |S| = 2, then y satisfies (8). We obtain y ∈ P H . Let i min ∈ arg min i∈N \H
Consequently, x 1 ≥ṁ. Define y by formula (9), where α i , i ∈ H, and β are determined by (10) with S = K. Such α 2 , α 3 exist because 2ṁ
> 0. As in subcase 1 of this theorem, we can prove that y ∈ P H and y {2,3.4} x.
The second example shows that Theorem 2.6 cannot be extended to game ν H with n ≥ 6 and |H| = 3. < 2ṁ, the condition (8) does not hold, i.e. y / ∈ P H . So y / ∈ W H . As in the proof of Theorem 2.6 we see that dominations can be done only via coalitions {1, 2, j}, j ∈ N \ H. Pick {1, 2, 4} and assume the existence of imputation x ∈ W H such that x {1,2.4} y. Then x(1, 2, 4) ≤ ν H (1, 2, 4) = 2ṁ. Since x 4 > y 4 >ṁ we obtain x / ∈ C(ν H ). Hence, x ∈ P H . From (8) and x(1, 2, 4) ≤ 2ṁ it follows that x(1, 2, 4) = 2ṁ. By (5)-(6), x 5 = x 6 = µ x >ṁ. Consequently, x(N ) = 2ṁ + 2µ x + x 3 > 4ṁ = 1, which contradicts x ∈ I(ν H ). Thus the set P H , violates the external stability property.
Results interpretation and conclusion
The construction and interpretation of vNM solutions are important from the viewpoint of economic applications and theory. Any game ν H is symmetric w.r.t. the coalitions H and N \ H, but it does not symmetric as a whole. The average marginal contribution of a participant of coalition H (small agent) is less than that of a participant of N \ H (big agent). The Shapley value Sh(ν H ) reflects this fact: Sh i (ν H ) < Sh j (ν H ) for all i ∈ H, j ∈ N \ H. All 1-convex games considered here have the identical cores that are symmetric w.r.t. the grand coalition and coincide with the core of convex game ω. The cores contain special allocations where the payoffs of all small agents are the maximum they could get (i.e. equal toṁ), while one of big agents gets nothing. Unlike the core, every imputation in F H ore P H assigns to a big agent more thanṁ while the payoff of each small agent is less thanṁ. So, they prescribe a rather natural and intuitive outcomes.
Note that for ν H with n = 5 and |H| = 3, every x ∈ I(ν H ) satisfying (6),(8) and x(H) = (|H| − 1)ṁ belongs to C(ν H ). Similarly, for ν H with |H| = 2, every x ∈ I(ν H ) satisfying (6) and the last equality, belongs to C(ν H ). Thus, in spite of strict inequality (5), Q H and W H are the closed sets in R N Let's look at the game ν H with n = 5 and |H| = 3. Assume that the grand coalition formes and players agree on using the vNM solution as stability concept. The following decision-making process is possible.
First stage. The players decide, must the outcome belong to the core or not. If yes, they chose a core selector and the game ends. Otherwise, the players partition themselves into subcoalitions: the union H of small agents and union N \ H of big ones.
Second stage. The big agents bargain about the portion x(H) < (|H| − 1)ṁ of cooperation surplus that must get the union H. No player in H can participate in this stage of negotiations. The big agents union's power is such that x(H) can be equal to zero. When union N \ H has made his decision, the value ν H (N ) − x(H) is divided equally among its members, i.e. each of them receives µ x >ṁ. After that all big agents leave the game. Last stage. The small agents discuss how to share x(H). They play the reduced game (H, ν It is of interest to find the explicit form of vNM solutions for games with player set N , integer characteristic functionsω = ω/ṁ,ν H = ν H /ṁ and integer side payments (discrete games). Even the convexity ofω is not sufficient for stability of the core [6] . However, we know that any discrete game has a finite number of vNM solutions and they can be calculated with the graph theory algorithms.
